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LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICA¶S LONE STAR CONSTITUTION: HOW SUPREME 
COURT CASES FROM TEXAS SHAPE THE NATION (UNIVERSITY OF 
CALIFORNIA PRESS 2018). PP. 320. HARDCOVER $85.00. PAPERBACK 
$34.95. 
JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2018). PP.
296. HARDCOVER $29.95. 
INTRODUCTION
Constitutional law in the United States is most often taught, studied, and understood 
by focusing on the progression of key Supreme Court opinions.1 The dominance of this 
perspective is understandable. Many significant cultural and social issues come to a head 
before the Supreme Court.2 0RUHRYHUWKH&RXUW¶VSULYLOHJHGSRVLWLRQDVWKHILQDODUELWHU
of most federal constitutional disputes means that its opinions carry great weight and can 
change or re-direct constitutional norms.3 The Supreme Court is no doubt influential, and 
its opinions tell us a great deal about constitutional development in the United States. It is 
no surprise, therefore, that law students learn about American constitutional law primarily 
by reading opinions from the Supreme Court, that lawyers most often frame constitutional 
issues by reference only to the United States Constitution,4 and that scholars construct 
theories of constitutionalism by drawing mostly from Supreme Court opinions and federal 
                                                          
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. 
 1. A quick review of notable constitutional casebooks shows this. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 2017); PAUL BREST, ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING:
CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2018). 
2. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (marriage equality); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973) (abortion); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (school desegregation). 
3. See generally Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164, 1172±73
(1988) (describing broader institutional context that has elevated the Supreme Court to a prominent role in 
directing constitutional change). 
4. See generally Justin Long, Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 41 (2006) (tracing 
dominance of federal law in constitutional jurisprudence). 
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sources.5
-XGJH -HIIUH\ 6 6XWWRQ¶V 51 Imperfect Solutions6 DQG /XFDV $ 3RZH -U¶V
America’s Lone Star Constitution offer compelling critiques of this perspective on 
American constitutionalism.7 Both Sutton and Powe draw our attention away from the 
Supreme Court and towards the states as key components of American constitutionalism; 
although they do this from different vantage points. 
Sutton, on the one hand, adds a fresh voice to the longstanding call for lawyers, 
judges, and professors to take state constitutions seriously when engaging with 
constitutional rights.8 6XWWRQ¶V FHQWUDO FODLP LV WKDW ³DQ XQGHUDSSUHFLDWLRQ RI VWDWH
constitutional law has hurt state and federal law and undermined the appropriate balance 
EHWZHHQVWDWHDQGIHGHUDOFRXUWVLQSURWHFWLQJLQGLYLGXDOOLEHUW\´9 He supports this claim 
by providing detailed accounts of how four individual rights issues developed through 
complex processes and moved through dynamic institutional machinery.10 In the course 
of these narratives, Sutton successfully shows that the Supreme Court is only one 
component of how American constitutionalism operates to protect individual liberty. He 
also observes that premature nationalization of individual rights by the Court can 
sometimes be detrimental to liberty, and that allowing state courts to wrestle with rights 
issues can be beneficial.11 His account is a compelling critique of the dominant view that 
the Supreme Court should be the primary institution resolving rights disputes. 
Powe, on the other hand, provides an equally compelling critique but from a very 
different vantage point. Powe focuses exclusively on Texas.12 His book starts with the 
EROGEXWLQWULJXLQJFODLPWKDW³[m]ore important United States Supreme Court cases have 
originated in Texas than in any other state, so many, in fact, that the entire basic courses 
in constitutional law in both law schools and political science departments could be taught 
XVLQJQRWKLQJEXW7H[DVFDVHV´13 This claim is both a teaser and a nuanced commentary 
                                                          
5. See, e.g., David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 762 (2012) (focusing on Federal Constitution as basis for comparing American constitutionalism 
to constitutions around the world). But see Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional 
Exceptionalism Revisited, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641 (2014) (comparing state constitutions to constitutions around 
the world). 
 6. JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2018). 
 7. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICA¶S LONE STAR CONSTITUTION: HOW SUPREME COURT CASES FROM 
TEXAS SHAPE THE NATION (2018). 
 8. Key sources exploring state constitutionalism in depth include, G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 26 (1998); ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS (2009); 
JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS (2005). Other sources analyzing in depth why 
independent state constitutionalism has not developed further include, Long, supra note 4; Lawrence Friedman, 
Path Dependence and the External Constraints on Independent State Constitutionalism, 115 PENN ST. L. REV.
83 (2011). 
9. See SUTTON, supra note 6, at 6, 174. For landmark treatments of the relationship between liberty and 
America¶s dual constitutional structure, see generally GARDNER, supra note 8; ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO,
POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (2009). 
 10. Sutton focuses on public education financing, SUTTON, supra note 6, at 22±41; criminal procedure and 
the exclusionary rule, id. at 42±83; compelled sterilization, id. at 84±132; and free speech, free exercise, and 
freedom from mandatory flag salutes, id. at 133±72. 
11. See id. at 5. 
 12. POWE, supra note 7, at 249±62. 
13. Id. at 1. 
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on the conditions that underly constitutional adjudication before the Supreme Court.14
3RZH¶VERRNLVLPSRUWDQWEHFDXVHRIKLVXQLTXHSHUVSHFWLYHDVERWKDQH[SHUWLQ7H[DV
legal and political history and a master scholar of the Supreme Court. From this unique 
vantage point, Powe uncovers the ground-level complexities that drive constitutional 
litigation in Texas while also placing them in the nuanced context of the Supreme Court 
and national politics. By focusing narrowly on Texas, Powe provides a compelling account 
of how national constitutional litigation is often influenced by complex state and local 
factors. His book is both a detailed history of constitutional law from Texas and a powerful 
account of how politics and law at the local, state, and federal levels influence Supreme 
Court outcomes. 
In this review, I briefly sketch what I believe to be the main contributions of each 
book. I then provide a few thoughts about where these important works might lead us next. 
I. WHY WE NEED MORE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
Sutton argues that American constitutionalism needs more state constitutional 
jurisprudence.15 He offers three principal reasons for this. First, because state constitutions 
can sometimes provide a basis for relief independent of the Federal Constitution, lawyers 
better serve clients when they raise separate state constitutional claims.16 Second, in many 
cases, liberty will be better preserved by state courts than the United States Supreme Court 
EHFDXVH VWDWH FRXUWV DUH EHWWHU VLWXDWHG WR FUDIW UXOHV UHVSRQVLYH WR WKHLU VWDWH¶V
circumstances, mistaken state court opinions are more easily corrected, and difficult 
constitutional issues with no clear answer are better resolved by preserving competing 
positions across states (as opposed to randomly declaring one position the nationwide 
winner).17 Finally, Sutton explains that the Supreme Court and federal constitutional law 
would benefit from allowing state courts to wrestle with rights issues on their own before 
declaring a national outcome because robust state constitutional jurisprudence can better 
LQIRUPWKH&RXUW¶VRZQ ruling.18
These arguments have many longstanding exponents,19 EXW6XWWRQ¶VERRNSURYLGHV
                                                          
14. See id. at 255±62. 
15. See SUTTON, supra note 6, at 6, 174. 
16. Id. at 19. 
17. Id. at 16±19. 
18. Id. at 20. 
 19. On the idea that state constitutional jurisprudence can inform federal constitutional law, see generally 
Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323 (2011); Joseph 
Blocher, What State Constitutional Law Can Tell Us About the Federal Constitution, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 1035 
(2011). On the notion that lawyers and judges should invoke state constitutional rights to better serve clients and 
protect individual rights, see generally Hand Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States’ Bills of Rights,
9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980). On the notion that state courts can be more independent and perhaps aggressive 
in protecting rights because their judgments can be more easily corrected, see Conor O¶Mahony, If a Constitution 
Is Easy to Amend, Can Judges Be Less Restrained? Rights, Social Change, and Proposition 8, 27 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 191, 192 (2014); Blocher, Reverse Incorporation, supra note 19, at 358 (³It is possible that the political 
accountability of state judges (and the amendability of state constitutions) might encourage them to read state 
constitutions more expansively, knowing that their rulings can always be µcorrected¶ by a democratic majority.´); 
Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1409, 
1453 (1999) (³[T]heir greater accountability might render state judges more willing to read state constitutional 
guarantees expansively.´); Lawrence Schlam, State Constitutional Amending, Independent Interpretation, and 
Political Culture: A Case Study in Constitutional Stagnation, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 269, 285±86 (1994). 
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DWUXO\IUHVKH[SORUDWLRQRIVWDWHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP7KHFRUHRIWKHERRN¶VFRQWULEXWLRQLQ
my opinion, are the four individual rights narratives that Sutton provides to substantiate 
the value of state constitutionalism. His narratives are rich in detail, doctrinal nuance, and 
pragmatic insight. Sutton masterfully weaves together complicated developments in 
federal constitutional jurisprudence with related evolutions in state law to present a more 
accurate, dynamic, and compelling account of American constitutionalism.20
'HVFULSWLYHO\6XWWRQ¶VQDUUDWLYHV UHYHDO WKDW$PHULFDQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP LVPXFK
more complicated than a myopic obsession with Supreme Court opinions suggest. Sutton 
shows that in various contemporary instances, state constitutions have had a positive 
impact on the trajectory of American constitutionalism.21 From a normative perspective, 
6XWWRQ¶V QDUUDWLYHV DOVR UHYHDO WKDW HQJDJLQJ ZLWK WKH FRPSOH[LWLHV of American 
constitutional structure, specifically embracing a dual system of rights protections, can 
increase the overall quality of the constitutional order. For Sutton, this improvement is 
JDXJHGE\WKHV\VWHP¶VHIILFDF\LQ³PD[LPL]LQJOLEHUW\´ZKLFKdoes not, as he argues, 
³LQYDULDEO\IROORZIURPDQDWLRQDOUXOH´ 22
)URPDSUDFWLFDOSHUVSHFWLYH6XWWRQ¶VQDUUDWLYHVEULQJWROLIHPDQ\RIWKHFRQFHSWV
and ideas that proponents of state constitutionalism have articulated but failed to 
meaningfully animatH 6XWWRQ¶V QDUUDWLYHV GHPRQVWUDWH LQ SUDFWLFDO ZD\V WKDW VWDWH
constitutions truly matter and that lawyers and judges can and should use them in 
principled ways. 
II. WHY WE NEED TEXAS
3RZH¶V book is a rare treat for anyone interested in understanding how American 
constitutional law evolves. The book ostensibly focuses on Texas, but its contribution is 
PXFK EURDGHU 3RZH¶V RUJDQL]LQJ SUHPLVH LV WKDW 7H[DV KDV SURGXFHGPRUH ODQGPDUN
Supreme Court decisions than any other state. In exploring that claim, he provides a 
detailed, bottom-up perspective on a full gamut of landmark Supreme Court opinions.23
,QP\YLHZWKHJUHDWYDOXHRI3RZH¶VERRNLVWKDWLWEULQJVWRJHWKHUDUDUHFRPELQDWLRQRI
expertise in both Texas law and political history and the Supreme Court and federal 
constitutional law. His book provides a window into the layers and nuance of constitutional 
change in the United States that few others can offer. 
3RZH¶VOLVWRIODQGPDUNFDVHVfrom Texas is impressive. It includes United States v. 
Lopez, City of Boerne v. Flores, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez,
Shelby County v. Holder, Roe v. Wade, Lawrence v. Texas, and Fisher v. University of 
Texas. He organizes these cases and others around four general characteristics of Texas. 
                                                          
 20. He suggests, for example, that the Supreme Court¶s refusal to set a national rule requiring equal funding 
for public schools may have nevertheless advanced education equality because many states subsequently pushed 
their state constitutional jurisprudence to impose more rigorous requirements on state legislatures than the 
Supreme Court would have imposed. See SUTTON, supra note 6, at 35±41. In the criminal procedure context, 
Sutton shows how the Supreme Court benefited from allowing the states to experiment with the exclusionary 
rule before the Court imposed a national rule on the states. Id. at 68±69. 
21. See id. at 96±114 (noting how early state constitutional challenges to mandatory sterilization laws were 
successful). 
22. Id. at 77. 
 23. For a helpful overview of the cases, see POWE, supra note 7, at 249±55. 
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He first discusses cases related to race in the context of Texas as a former member of the 
Confederacy and a Jim Crow state.24 +H WKHQ WUDFHV WKH HYROXWLRQ RI WKH FRXUW¶V
jurisprudence regarding federal and state economic regulation in the context of Texas as 
an emerging western state during the early to mid-twentieth century.25 He discusses Due 
Process and First Amendment cases in the context of Texas as a state long concerned with 
morality and culture and, more recently, a state dominated by Republican politics.26 He 
concludes with a chapter discussing several cases that he attributes to conditions that are 
³GLVWLQFWO\7H[DV´27 He places Lawrence v. Texas, the capital punishment cases, and mid-
century, partisan re-districting cases in that category. 
Powe traces all of these landmark cases back to their roots in Texas while also 
retaining their national context and significance. The result is a series of detailed 
explorations of how constitutional litigation develops and a nuanced account of the many 
different factors that influence Supreme Court outcomes. From grass-roots politics and 
state procedural oddities, to lawyering missteps and the influence of national interest 
JURXSV3RZH¶VERRNWUDFHVWKHfull litany of factors that can affect constitutional evolution. 
2QHH[DPSOHLVQRWHZRUWK\EHFDXVHLWWLHVWRJHWKHU3RZH¶VERRNZLWK6XWWRQ¶VZRUN
,Q3RZH¶VGLVFXVVLRQRILawrence v. Texas, he notes that the case gave Lambda Legal (a 
national organizationD UDUHRSSRUWXQLW\ WRFKDOOHQJH WKH&RXUW¶VKROGLQJ LQBowers v. 
HardwickZKLFKXSKHOGDVWDWH¶VDXWKRULW\WRFULPLQDOL]HSULYDWHKRPRVH[XDOFRQGXFW28
To challenge Bowers, Lambda needed a state to charge someone, but it was very unusual 
for states to prosecute private homosexual conduct. Thus, when the Harris County 
SURVHFXWRU FKDUJHG -RKQ /DZUHQFH DQG 7\VRQ *DUQHU ZLWK FULPLQDO ³KRPRVH[XDO
FRQGXFW´/DPEGDZDVTXLFN WR DFFHSW WKH LQYLWDWLRQ WR UHSUHVHQW WKHP29 Powe notes, 
however, that if the defendants were acquitted in a Texas state court, Lambda would lose 
the opportunity to challenge Bowers before the Supreme Court.30 Thus, in light of 
/DPEGD¶VXOWLPDWHLQWHUHVWLQWKHFDVHLWVVWUDWHJ\LQWKHORZHUFRXUWVZDVWRORVH31 Indeed, 
the defendants pleaded no contest, and Lambda appealed, attacking the constitutionality 
of the Texas law. 
On appeal, Lambda raised several federal constitutional challenges aimed at 
overruling Bowers. However, it also argued that the Texas statute was unconstitutional 
under the Texas Constitution.32 Powe perceptively notes that this was a tactical error by 
Lambda because if the Texas court accepted the argument, the case would have been 
resolved on an adequate and independent state ground, thus insulating it from review by 
the United States Supreme Court.33 Because Lambda and the defendants were primarily 
                                                          
24. See id. at 15±68. 
25. See id. at 69±129. 
26. See id. at 135±93. 
27. See id. at 195±248. 
28. See POWE, supra note 7, at 200±01. 
 29. Id.
 30. Lambda did not pursue this at the expense of their clients. Powe notes that the defendants were aligned 
with Lambda¶s ultimate goal and ³had little at stake and fac[ed] no prospect of jail time.´ Id. at 201. 
31. Id.
32. Id.
 33. POWE, supra note 7, at 200±01. 
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concerned with challenging Bowers, their safest strategy would have been to omit any state 
challenges and force Texas courts to resolve the case on federal law. 
This tidbit from PRZH¶V ERRN LOOXVWUDWHV WKH PDQ\ OD\HUV RI $PHULFDQ
constitutionalism. On the one hand, Sutton is surely correct that state constitutions matter 
and that lawyers should not overlook them in ignorance. On the other hand, if we start with 
the assumption that constitutional change is often pursued through litigation, then we must 
account for the reality that litigants (who are the dominant architects of these cases) may 
have various objectives when asserting constitutional claims. Similarly, we must also 
account for the realities that judges face when deciding constitutional cases. Some judges 
may find it advantageous to invoke the state constitution to insulate rulings from Supreme 
Court review. Other judges²perhaps elected judges or those subject to recall²may find 
a safe harbor in lockstepping with federal law. In any event, by capturing the detailed 
KLVWRULHVRIFRUHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOFDVHV3RZH¶VERRNUHYHDOVWKHOD\HUVRIFRPSOH[LW\WKDW
characterize litigation as a pathway of constitutional change. 
CONCLUSION
%RWK6XWWRQDQG3RZH¶VERRNVDUHLPSRUWDQWFRQWULEXWLRQV7KH\ERWKHQFRXUDJHXV
to reject narrow, top-down perspectives on American constitutional law and to look more 
broadly at state and local actors that animate constitutional development. Taking this cue, 
I note that both Sutton and Powe focus their discussions primarily around constitutional 
litigation and judicial rulings as representative of American constitutional law. Sutton 
exhorts us to ensure that state constitutional jurisprudence is included in the corpus, but 
his ultimate focus is on judicial rulings regarding the meaning of constitutional norms. To 
be sure, Sutton discusses how state legislatures have played a role in protecting individual 
rights, but his main concern is about how broader judicial development of state 
constitutional jurisprudence can improve American constitutionalism. Powe offers a 
slightly broader perspective, but he is likewise focused mostly on explaining and 
contextualizing landmark Supreme Court cases as representative of American 
constitutional law. 
My own perspective is that we must broaden our view on constitutional law even 
further to include more than just constitutional jurisprudence by courts²federal or state. 
The defining characteristic of state constitutionalism in recent decades has not been court 
opinions but the frequent use of formal amendment procedures by interest groups and 
public officials to change and direct constitutional norms.34 To be sure, federal 
constitutional law does not often change in this way because the Federal Constitution is 
much more difficult to amend. But the reality of state constitutionalism is that amendment 
actors make and change constitutional law as much or more than judges.35 A full 
perspective on American constitutionalism must account for this law-making activity in 
addition to state and federal court opinions. A full perspective will require an appreciation 
for how judicial decision-making and methodology might change when the underlying 
                                                          
34. See generally JOHN J. DINAN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: GOVERNING BY AMENDMENT IN THE 
AMERICAN STATES (2018). 
35. See Jonathan L. Marshfield, The Amendment Effect, 98 B.U. L. REV. 55 (2018); Jonathan L. Marshfield, 
Courts and Informal Constitutional Change in the States, 51 N.E. L. REV. 453, 455 (2017). 
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constitution is fluid and frequently modified. This more structurally informed perspective 
on American constitutionalism, I believe, will be the next important layer to unpack as we 
seek to understand and live under American constitutionalism. 
